A remark on bargaining and non-expected utility
نویسنده
چکیده
We show that a bargaining game of alternating offers with exogenous risk of breakdown and played by dynamically consistent non-expected utility maximizers is formally equivalent to Rubinstein’s (1982) game with time preference. Within this game, the behavior of dynamically consistent players is indistinguishable from the behavior of expected utility maximizers. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C72, C78.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 44 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2002