Rewards in an Experimental Sender-Receiver Game
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show in a sender-receiver game with strictly opposing interests that rewards enhance trust but do not influence truth-telling. Subjects who reward tend to tell the truth and trust more often in the presence and absence of reward opportunities. The amount of obtained rewards thereby enhances truth-telling. JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83.
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