Silence is Golden. Suggested Donations in Voluntary Contribution Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
We report on the results of laboratory experiments of voluntary giving with suggested donations. Asking subjects to give the socially optimal amount reduces giving compared to no suggestion. Asking subjects not to give also depresses giving. However, moderate suggested donations produce modest positive e¤ects. We o¤er a model using the fairness equilibrium framework of Rabin (1993) that is capable of rationalizing some of these results.
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