Metzinger, T. & Windt, J. M. (2015). What Does it Mean to Have an Open MIND?
نویسندگان
چکیده
In our discussions leading up to the Open MIND collection’s going online, we thought long and hard about how exactly to showcase the vast material in this collection and the ideas and motivations behind the project in our editors’ introduction. We first thought about using the introduction to briefly summarize the takehome message of every single target article, commentary, and reply, as is customary in introductions to edited collections. This struck us, however, as being both unwieldy and redundant: it would have entailed summarizing and commenting on a total of 117 texts. More importantly, due to the online format of the collection (including in-text search functions) and the inclusion of abstracts and keywords in the papers themselves, the authors have already provided concise introductions to their own texts. Retracing their steps in an editorial introduction would not have added anything to the value and usability of the collection. We then considered using the introduction to create our own personal best-of-Open-MIND list, discussing what we take to be the most valuable insights in every single article, or perhaps even focusing on the contributions that we personally take to be the most theoretically important. Though our own list of personal favorites seemed to write itself naturally during the editing process, this strategy quickly struck us as being at odds with our motivation for creating the collection in the first place. Using the editors’ introduction to create a personal best-of list would have been highly selective and biased by our own personal research interests and styles in a way that we felt would have contradicted our own ideal of open mindedness. In fact, for this reason, we decided to omit any references to the contributions to Open MIND in this introduction. These considerations naturally gave rise to a more difficult and more profound question: What exactly do we mean by “open mindedness,” not just in general, but in the context of interdisciplinary research on the mind? The strategy of using the contributions to the Open MIND collection as a foil for this more general academic variant of open mindedness was tempting. But again, we quickly realized that this approach would strike many readers (as well as, perhaps, some of our own authors) as highly idiosyncratic, arbitrary, or self-important.
منابع مشابه
Block, N. (2015). The Puzzle of Perceptual Precision
This paper argues for a failure of correspondence between perceptual representation and what it is like to perceive. If what it is like to perceive is grounded in perceptual representation, then, using considerations of veridical representation, we can show that inattentive peripheral perception is less representationally precise than attentive foveal perception. However, there is empirical evi...
متن کاملCruse, H. & Schilling, M. (2015). The Bottom-Up Approach: Benefits and Limits - A Reply to Aaron Gutknecht
We appreciate the comments given by Aaron Gutknecht very much, in particular his discussion and clarification of the term “emergence” and its philosophical background. This discussion comprises a sensible completion of our article going beyond the scope of our expertise. In this context, Aaron Gutknecht correctly states that our way of using the term “emergence” may cover two aspects, one calle...
متن کاملThompson, E. (2015). Dreamless Sleep, the Embodied Mind, and Consciousness - The Relevance of a Classical Indian Debate to Cognitive Science
One of the major debates in classical Indian philosophy concerned whether consciousness is present or absent in dreamless sleep. The philosophical schools of Advaita Vedānta and Yoga maintained that consciousness is present in dreamless sleep, whereas the Nyāya school maintained that it is absent. Consideration of this debate, especially the reasoning used by Advaita Vedānta to rebut the Nyāya ...
متن کاملBlock, N. (2015). Solely Generic Phenomenology - A Reply to Sascha Benjamin Fink
If representationism is true, phenomenal precision is given by representational precision. But what if representationism is false as I claim? Can we make sense of phenomenal precision? Fink argues that there is a danger of trivialization of phenomenal precision and that the one way out may be incompatible with my view that consciousness overflows cognition. I try to say more about how to clarif...
متن کاملDresler, M. (2015). The Multifunctionality of Dreaming and the Oblivious Avatar - A Commentary on Revonsuo & Colleagues
Sleep and dreaming do not serve a single biological function, but are multifunctional. Their functions include memory consolidation and integration, emotion regulation, creativity and problem solving, and preparation for waking life. One promising level of description is that of dreaming as a virtual reality: The dreamer interacts with a simulated environment including other simulated avatars. ...
متن کامل