Exponential Weight Functions for Quasi-Proportional Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
In quasi-proportional auctions, the allocation is shared among bidders in proportion to their weighted bids. The auctioneer selects a bid weight function, and bidders know the weight function when they bid. In this note, we analyze how weight functions that are exponential in the bid affect bidder behavior. We show that exponential weight functions have a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we characterize bids at an equilibrium, and we compare it to an equilibrium for power weight functions.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1509.01314 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015