Core and Stable Sets of Large Games Arising in Economics
نویسندگان
چکیده
It is shown that the core of a non-atomic glove-market game which is defined as the minimum of finitely many non-atomic probability measures is a von Neumann Morgenstern stable set. This result is used to characterize some stable sets of large games which have a decreasing returns to scale property. We also study exact non-atomic glove-market games. In particular we show that in a glove-market game which consists of the minimum of finitely many mutually singular non-atomic measures, the core is a von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set iff the game is exact. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C70, C71, D24. 1996 Academic Press, Inc. article no. 0010
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