Is There a Place for Animals in the Moral Consideration of Nature?

The compatibility of an "animal lib­ eration" ethic and an environmental eth ic depends prima ri lyon how one interprets the meaning and moral structu re of a theory of envi ronmental ethics. In part this is because the meaning and moral structure of an animal liberation ethic is fairly straightforward: it focuses on the absence of morally relevant differences between humans and animals, and on the moral significance of animal pain and suffering. 1 But the form of an environmental ethic is not so clear. Does an environmental ethic advocate moral concern for natural individuals, for species I for ecosystems, or per­ haps for nature as a whole? An ans­ wer to this question is required before one can judge the relationship between animal liberation and environ­ mental ethics, but an answer', unfor­ tunately, is not easily discernible. In what follows I will argue, first, that several versions of an envi ronmental ethic yield problematic environmental and moral conclusions; second, that an environmental ethic must be inter­ preted as a complex balancing of dif­ ferent kinds of moral concern-i.e., moral concern for individuals, for species, and . for natu ral ecosys­ tems-and th i rd, that this balanci ng will pr"oduce moral results that are troubling to the advocate of an animal I ibet"ation eth ic.