Knowing Qualia: A Reply to Jackson

V . S . Ramachandran and William Hirstein Three Laws of Qualia

Neurological syndromes in which consciousness seems to malfunction, such as temporal lobe epilepsy, visual scotomas, Charles Bonnet syndrome, and synesthesia offer valuable clues about the normal functions of consciousness and ‘qualia’. An investigation into these syndromes reveals, we argue, that qualia are different from other brain states in that they possess three functional characteristics...

Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument: On Qualia, Physical Information, and the Supposed Falsity of Physicalism

In “Epiphenomenal Qualia” Frank Jackson argues against Physicalism (the thesis that all correct information is physical information) and for the existence of qualia on the grounds that all of the physical information possible cannot explain the qualitative feel of experience (qualia). In “The Knowledge Argument for Qualia” Jackson partakes in a thought experiment using the examples of “Fred” an...

An epistemological theory of consciousness?

This article takes up the issue of the plausibility of epistemological theories of consciousness: accounts of the so-called " hard problem " of phenomenal consciousness (Chalmers 1996) that are rooted in physicalistic explanations of what we know and how we know it. Such accounts elaborate how physical systems come to (perceptually) know their physical environments and show how perceivers may c...

The Chinese Room: Qualia and Semantics

Throughout the literature generated by Searle’s Chinese Room Argument, the Robot Reply has persistently beckoned a more thorough response. Many proponents of AI have stood their ground in holding that there is something intuitively correct about such a reply. For example, critics such as Bridgeman and Abelson contend that if a super robot were able to interact with the world, then this should g...

Lepetit and Jackson reply:.