Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Collision in Private Value Ascending Price Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
We investigate bidder collusion in one-sided ascending price auctions without communication. If bidding rules in an English-type auction allow bidders to match each others' bids, collusion can be sustained as a Nash equilibrium of a one-shot auction game. Our earlier experiments show that in common value auctions with complete information, collusion does occur and is sustainable even when bidders cannot explicitly coordinate their strategies. In this study, we investigate the robustness of bidders' collusive behavior in private values, private information environments. We nd that collusion still occurs as long as the bidders' gains from collusion are high. JEL classi cation code: C92, D44
منابع مشابه
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Non-existence of Equilibrium in Vickrey, Second-price, and English Auctions
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تاریخ انتشار 2000