The 11-20 Money Request Game: Evaluating the Upper Bound of k-Level Reasoning

نویسندگان

  • Ayala Arad
  • Ariel Rubinstein
چکیده

We study experimentally a two-player game which we find ideal for investigating k-level reasoning. Each player requests an amount of money between 11 and 20 shekels. He receives the amount that he requests and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the other player, he receives an additional 20 shekels. The best response function in this game is straightforward, the k-level strategies are invariant to the two prominent level-0 specifications (randomization or attraction to salience) and the situation calls for self-interest behavior only. Therefore, we propose the game as a test for the "upper bound" for the depth of k-level reasoning in a population. We support this conjecture by studying several variations of the game which manipulate the attractiveness of the level-0 strategy and the monetary cost of undercutting the other player.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

The 11-20 Money Request Game: A Comment on the Upper Bound of k-Level Reasoning

We study experimentally a new two-player game: Each player requests an amount between 11 and 20 shekels. He receives the requested amount and if he requests exactly one shekel less than the other player, he receives additional 20 shekels. Level-k reasoning is appealing and straightforward here, especially due to the natural starting point (requesting 20) and the simple best-response function. W...

متن کامل

Level-k reasoning and time pressure in the 11-20 money request game

Arad and Rubinstein (2012a) have designed a novel game to study level-k reasoning experimentally. Just like them, we find that the depth of reasoning is very limited and clearly different from equilibrium play. We show that such behavior is even robust to repetitions, hence there is, at best, little learning. However, under time pressure, behavior is, perhaps coincidentally, closer to equilibri...

متن کامل

Noisy Introspection in the “11–20” Game

Arad and Rubinstein (American Economic Review, 102(7), 2012, 3561–3573) recently proposed a simple money-request game designed to trigger level-k reasoning. In an experiment that explores three variants of the game, they find evidence for the level-k model with observed levels of strategic thinking consistently ranging from 0 to 3. Our baseline treatment uses the basic version of the money-requ...

متن کامل

Introducing the Time Value of Money in a Non-consignment Vendor Managed Inventory Model

Vendor managed inventory (VMI) is an integrated approach for buyer–vendor coordination, according to which the vendor (supplier or manufacturer) decides on the appropriate buyer’s (retailer’s) inventory levels. The time value of money has not traditionally been considered in evaluating VMI supply chain’s total inventory cost in any studies up to now. Therefore, in the present study a new model ...

متن کامل

The 11 – 20 Money Request Game : A Level - k Reasoning Study

The experimental results in one-shot two-player games often differ significantly from the Nash equilibrium predictions. A major task of the experimental game-theoretic literature is to provide better tools for explaining behavior in such situations. Prominent in this literature is the concept of level-k reasoning, first introduced in Stahl and Wilson (1994, 1995) and Nagel (1995). A standard le...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2010