Cooperation: Integrating Evolutionary and Ecological Perspectives
نویسنده
چکیده
Putting a competitive squeeze on a cooperative group has long been considered to encourage cheats. Now we learn that competition, by driving diversification among cooperators, can create groups that are both more productive and more resistant to defection.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Current Biology
دوره 16 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006