Intersubjective Externalism * Peter Pagin
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper I present the idea of a kind of externalism different from what is usually considered in the internalism / externalism debate. It is intersubjective in nature, since it concerns representation determined by relations between cognitive subjects. More precisely, it concerns linguistic expression types. The basic idea is that the meaning of linguistic expression types often depends on external factors over and above any external factors that serve to determine the contents of the thoughts of speaker and hearer. In particular, this kind of intersubjective externalism can hold even internalism is true of thought content itself.
منابع مشابه
A Metaphilosophical Dilemma for Epistemic Externalism
In this article I argue that the prevalence of intersubjective disagreement in epistemology poses a serious problem for Epistemic Externalism. I put the problem in the form of a dilemma: either Epistemic Externalism is not a complete account of epistemic justification or it’s implausible to claim that the belief that Epistemic Externalism is true is itself an externalistically justified belief.
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This is a submitted version of a paper published in Linguistics and Philosophy. Citation for the published paper: Pagin, P., Westerståhl, D. (2011) "Pure Quotation and General Compositionality" Linguistics and Philosophy URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10988-011-9083-8 Access to the published version may require subscription. Permanent link to this version: http://urn.kb.se/resolve?urn=urn:nbn:...
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