Numerical Analysis of Asymmetric First Price Auctions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We propose numerical algorithms for solving first price auction problems where bidders draw independent valuations from heterogeneous distributions. The heterogeneity analyzed in this work is what might naturally emerge when subsets of distributionally homogeneous bidders collude. Bid functions and expected revenues are calculated for two special cases. Extensions to more general asymmetric first price auctions are discussed. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D44, C63, C72, D82. © 1994 Academic Press, Inc.
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Article history: Received 1 November 2009 Available online 3 March 2011 JEL classification: D44 C63 C72 D82
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