Spinoza and Kant on Suicide

In this paper I’m going to argue that both, Spinoza and Kant, construct the argument “for the impossibility of self-destruction” and examine how the concept of suicide relates to the concept of humanity in both philosophers. I will argue that Kant’s and Spinoza’s argument for the impossibility of self-destruction follows from the “external cause” premise and not from “the same subject” premise. I will try to show that Spinoza and Kant argue that suicide is irrational – it is never done rationally or freely. Introduction Spinoza’s theory of ethics differs from Kant’s theory. The notion of good is primary in Spinoza’s ethics and Spinoza derives the notion of right from the notion of good. In Kant’s ethics the notion of duty, i.e the notion of right, is primary. He derives the notion of good from the notion of right. Kant explicitly rejects Spinoza’s metaphysics and Spinoza’s epistemology in his work. He argues that Spinoza’s metaphysics is a sort of dogmatism. However, both Kant and Spinoza argue that human beings have double nature. According to both philosophers, human nature is partly rational and partly instinctive. Both Kant and Spinoza did not explain the relation between rational and instinctive part of human nature in their work. However, they both argue that rational aspect of human nature is fundamental. Both Kant and Spinoza emphasize that it is not possible to know the essence of the thing in itself. The purpose of this inquiry is to show that in spite of huge ontological and epistemological differences in their philosophical theories, those two philosophers agree to some point in the questions concerning human nature. One of them is the question of suicide. In this paper I will argue that both 1 In his Opus Postumum, Kant makes a lot of references to Spinoza. © Res Cogitans 2007 no. 4, vol. 1, 132-144 thinkers argue that suicide cannot be committed rationally and that they both construct the same premises of this argument. Spinoza: External Cause Argument In E3P4 Spinoza argues: “Nothing can be destroyed save by an external cause.” Spinoza emphasizes: “And so while we regard the thing alone, and not external causes, we can find nothing in it which can destroy it.” I will call this argument the “external cause argument”. This argument can also be found in the E4P20Schol: “No one, therefore, unless he is overcome by external causes, and those contrary to his nature, neglects to see what is useful to him, i.e. to preserve his being. No one, I say, from the necessity of his nature, but driven by external causes, turns away from taking food, or commits suicide which can take place in many manners.” Thus, the external cause which destroys the thing is external to the thing’s proper essence. For Spinoza the “willed” self-destruction is impossible. According to Spinoza, an agent who commits a suicide is overcome by the external environment, which is operating contrary to the nature of an agent. So, any attempt to causally explain suicide must focus not on an agent who commits a suicide, but on the external cause which has operated contrary to the nature of an agent. Spinoza: “Not in the same Subject” Argument In E3P5 Spinoza claims: “Things are contrary by nature, that is, they cannot exist in the same subject, in so far as one can destroy the other.” I will call this proposition “not in the same subject” argument. According to Garret, Spinoza in this proposition wants to say either 1 or 2: 1) “... that the whole natures of the two things are incompatible – or in other words, that the whole nature of the first, and the whole nature 2 As Garret identifies it in “Spinoza’s Conatus Argument” p.230