Truthful Surveys

A truthful Screening Mechanism for Improving Information Asymmetry in Initial Public Offering Transactions

Interpolating Between Truthful and non-Truthful Mechanisms for Combinatorial Auctions

We study the communication complexity of combinatorial auctions via interpolation mechanisms that interpolate between non-truthful and truthful protocols. Specifically, an interpolation mechanism has two phases. In the first phase, the bidders participate in some non-truthful protocol whose output is itself a truthful protocol. In the second phase, the bidders participate in the truthful protoc...

Mechanism Design: Recent Developments∗

Game theory provides methods to predict the outcome of a given game. Mechanism design concerns the reverse question: given some desirable outcome, can we design a game which produces it? Formally, the environment is hA,N,Θi , where A is a set of feasible and verifiable alternatives or outcomes, N = {1, ..., n} is a set of agents, and Θ is a set of possible states of the world. We focus on priva...

Truthful Combinatorial Assignment without Money

Mechanism design with agents who do not have quasi-linear preferences is an important line of research in social choice theory. Finding domains which admit truthful mechanisms is of central importance, particularly due to the well known impossibility result by Gibbard and Satterthwaite. In this paper we introduce a general framework for combinatorial assignments without money but with public va...

A Note on the Power of Truthful Approximation Mechanisms

We study the power of polynomial-time truthful mechanisms comparing to polynomial time (non-truthful) algorithms. We show that there is a setting in which deterministic polynomialtime truthful mechanisms cannot guarantee a bounded approximation ratio, but a non-truthful FPTAS exists. We also show that in the same setting there is a universally truthful randomized mechanism that provides an appr...