Voting Rules and Budget Allocation in the Enlarged EU
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we argue that the bulk of EU budget spending can be attributed to measures of the distribution of voting power in the Council of Ministers. Using such estimates, we compare incumbent member states' predicted budget receipts before and after eastern enlargement, and examine the impact of different voting rules in EU-27. According to our estimates eastern enlargement has large effects on the budget receipts of the incumbent member states. Moreover, whether the voting rules are based on the Nice Treaty or the Constitutional Treaty makes a difference for most member states. JEL Classification: C71, D70, D72
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