From Contextualism to Contrastivism
نویسندگان
چکیده
Contextualism treats ‘knows’ as an indexical that denotes different epistemic properties in different contexts. Contrastivism treats ‘knows’ as denoting a ternary relation with a slot for a contrast proposition. I will argue that contrastivism resolves the main philosophical problems of contextualism, by employing a better linguistic model. Contextualist insights are best understood by contrastivist theory.
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On “ from Contextualism to Contrastivism ”
Jonathan Schaffer is sympathetic to the contextualist approach to epistemology, broadly construed, but thinks that it hasn’t got the account of the verb “knows” quite right. Contextualists are on to something, but their view needs to be reformulated to give a correct account of the way we talk about knowledge, and (he argues) the reformulated view can do a better job of developing and defending...
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