Uniform Equilibrium: More Than Two Players
نویسنده
چکیده
Until this day, no counter example was found. Furthermore, we have seen that a positive answer was given for several special classes, including recursive games (Everett, 1957), zero-sum games (Mertens and Neyman, 1981), two-player absorbing games (Vrieze and Thuijsman, 1989) and two-player non zero-sum games (Vieille, 1997b). For n-player games, existence of stationary equilibrium profiles was proven for irreducible games (Sobel, 1971, Federgruen, 1978) and of ‘almost’ stationary equilibrium profiles for games with additive rewards and additive transitions (Thuijsman and Raghavan, 1997). In this lecture I will review recent results for games with more than 2 players.
منابع مشابه
Uniform folk theorems in repeated anonymous random matching games
We study infinitely repeated anonymous random matching games played by communities of players, who only observe the outcomes of their own matches. It is well known that cooperation can be sustained in equilibrium for the prisoner’s dilemma (PD) through grim trigger strategies. Little is known about games beyond the PD. We study a new equilibrium concept, strongly uniform equilibrium (SUE, which...
متن کاملLocation Game on the Plane
We analyze Hotelling’s duopoly model on the plane. There are two players (firms) located in different points inside a circle and the customers are distributed with some density in it. The solution of two game-theoretic problems is derived. The first problem is to find the equilibrium prices for the homogeneous goods, and the second problem is to find the equilibrium allocation of the players in...
متن کاملMonetary and Fiscal Policy Interaction in Iran: A Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Approach
Achieving the goals of price stability, sustainable economic growth, and the improvement of many economic variables require coordination between the monetary and financial authorities. In this study, a new modified Keynesian stochastic dynamic equilibrium general equilibrium model is introduced for Iran and in the framework of game theory, optimal policy of fiscal and monetary authorities are d...
متن کاملCorrelated Equilibrium in Quitting Games
A quitting game is a sequential game where each player has two actions: to continue or to quit. The game continues as long as all players decide to continue. The moment at least one player decides to quit, the game terminates. The terminal payoff depends on the subset of players who quit at the terminating stage. If the game continues forever, then the payoff for the players is some fixed-payof...
متن کاملThreshold uncertainty in the private-information subscription game
We introduce threshold uncertainty, à la Nitzan and Romano (1990), into a private-values model of voluntary provision of a discrete public good. Players are allowed to make any level of contribution toward funding the good, which is provided if the cost threshold is reached. Otherwise, contributions are refunded. Conditions ensuring existence and uniqueness of a Bayesian equilibrium are establi...
متن کامل