To “ Information Aggregation in Dynamic Markets with Strategic Traders ”
نویسنده
چکیده
STEP 0: Suppose that for some ε > 0, the statement is not true. Then one can find an increasing sequence m1, m2, etc., such that for any j, in equilibrium (S∗ mj Y ∗ mj ), E[|yKmj − X(ω)|] ≥ ε. Consider this sequence for the rest of the proof. For notational convenience, without loss of generality, we assume that m1 = 1, m2 = 2, etc.; that is, we have a sequence of games ΓKm and corresponding equilibria (S∗ m Y ∗ m) in which E[|yKm −X(ω)|] ≥ ε > 0 for every m.
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