Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, California 91125 Strategic Voting in Sequential Committees
نویسنده
چکیده
We consider strategic voting with incomplete information and partially common values in sequential committees. A proposal is considered against the status quo in one committee, and only upon its approval advances for consideration in a second committee. Committee members (i) are privately and imperfectly informed about an unobservable state of nature which is relevant to their payoffs, and (ii) have a publicly observable bias with which they evaluate information. We show that the tally of votes in the originating committee can aggregate and transmit relevant information for members of the second committee in equilibrium, provide conditions for the composition and size of committees under which this occurs, and characterize all three classes of voting equilibria with relevant informative voting. JEL classification numbers: D72, D78, C72
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تاریخ انتشار 2007