Norm Enforcement Mechanism
نویسنده
چکیده
Norms are generally recognized as standards of behaviour and effective means to control and coordinate agents' activities. The development of a multi-agent system requires organizing the system in such a way that the standards of behaviour , represented by a set of norms, are actually followed by the agents. In this talk, I present an operational approach for organizing the overall multi-agent system behaviour by means of a norm enforcement mechanism. Such a mechanism monitors the behaviours of agents, evaluates if they violate any norm, and intervenes by responding to the norm violating agents. For many applications perfect monitoring or response is not always available or feasible. This presentation provides a logical analysis of imperfect monitor and response capabilities. The analysis can be used to determine if and to what extent a given set of norms can be enforced by a mechanism with imperfect monitor or response capabilities. If time allows, I will also present a game-theoretic approach to analyse the effectivity of norm enforcement mechanisms. This allows determining if a norm enforcement mechanism can bring about the desired overall system behaviour assuming that individual agents act in accordance with their design objectives.
منابع مشابه
Distributed Norm Enforcement Via Ostracism
An agent normative society has to deal with two main concerns: how to define norms and how to enforce them. Enforcement becomes a complex issue as agent societies become more decentralized and open. We propose a new distributed mechanism to enforce norms by ostracizing agents that do not abide by them. Our simulations have shown that, although complete ostracism is not always possible, the mech...
متن کاملNorm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners
Norm Enforcement in Social Dilemmas: An Experiment with Police Commissioners Do individuals trained in law enforcement punish or reward differently from typical student subjects? We analyze norm enforcement behavior of newly appointed police commissioners in both a Voluntary Contribution Mechanism game and a Common Pool Resource game. Our experimental design includes treatments where a reward o...
متن کاملImperfect Norm Enforcement in Stochastic Environments: An Analysis of Efficiency and Cost Tradeoffs
In heterogeneous multiagent systems, agents might interfere with each other either intentionally or unintentionally, as a side-effect of their activities. One approach to coordinating these agents is to restrict their activities by means of social norms whose compliance ensures certain system properties, or otherwise results in sanctions to violating agents. While most research on normative sys...
متن کاملAnalysis of Norms Game in networked societies
Norms, defined as generally accepted behaviour in societies without central authority (and thus distinguished from laws), are very powerful mechanism leading to coherent behaviour of the society members. This paper examines, within a simple numerical simulation, the various effects that may lead to norm formation and stability. The approach has been first used by Axelrod, who proposed two step ...
متن کاملAnother Hidden Cost of Incentives: The Detrimental Effect on Norm Enforcement
Monetary incentives are often considered as a way to foster contributions to public goods in society and firms. This paper investigates experimentally the effect of monetary incentives in the presence of a norm enforcement mechanism. Norm enforcement through peer punishment has been shown to be effective in raising contributions by itself. We test whether and how monetary incentives interact wi...
متن کامل