Do Optional Deductibles Reduce the Number of Doctor Visits? – Empirical Evidence with German Data
نویسندگان
چکیده
Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health care costs when individuals exhibit moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles may instead lead to self-selection into different insurance contracts. We use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 that measure individual health more accurately and include risk-attitudes towards health in order to determine the price elasticity of demand for health care. A latent class approach that takes into account the panel structure of the data reveals that the effect of deductibles on the number of doctor visits is negligible. Private add-on insurance increases the number of doctor visits. However, altogether the effects of the insurance state on the demand for doctor visits are small in magnitude. JEL Classification: I11, I18, G22
منابع مشابه
Ruhr Economic Papers Ruhr Economic Papers Ruhr Graduate School in Economics Do Optional Deductibles Reduce the Number of Doctor Visits? – Empirical Evidence with German Data
Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health care costs when individuals exhibit moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles may instead lead to self-selection into different insurance contracts. We use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 2002, 2004, and 2006 that measure individual h...
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Deductibles in health insurance are often regarded as a means to contain health care costs when the behaviour of individuals exhibits moral hazard. However, in the absence of moral hazard, voluntarily chosen deductibles rather lead to adverse selection. I use a set of new variables in the German Socioeconomic Panel for the years 2002, 2004 and 2006 that measure individual health more accurately...
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