Manipulation in Voting: Strategic Voting and Strategic Nomination

نویسنده

  • František Turnovec
چکیده

In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.

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تاریخ انتشار 2010