A note on repeated games with non-monotonie value
نویسنده
چکیده
We show that even when the information structure is independent of the state of nature, the value of the n-stage zero-sum game with incomplete information is not necessarily monotonic with respect to the length of the game. More precisely, we give an example of such an n-stage game in which v~>v~<v~.
منابع مشابه
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عنوان ژورنال:
- Int. J. Game Theory
دوره 26 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1997