Honesty and informal agreements
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 24 November 2015 Available online 27 December 2016 JEL classification: C72 C78 C92 D03 D86
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 102 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017