Assessing the proliferation risks of civilian nuclear programmes

Nuclear power plants alone are not a proliferation risk. Without enrichment or reprocessing capabilities, power-reactor fuel, whether fresh or spent, cannot be used for the production of nuclear weapons. There are various ways, however, in which reactor projects and related nuclear fuel-cycle facilities could be used to further a nuclear-weapons development programme. This chapter describes these various possible proliferation pathways. It should be stressed that no successful nuclearweapons programme has ever relied on commercial reactors. Most of the states that have pursued weapons programmes went on to construct nuclear power plants, but only after their dedicated military programmes were successful, nearing success or had been abandoned. The scenarios for proliferation activities related to nuclear power plants described here are, therefore, only hypothetical, but they cannot be ruled out, especially in light of the increasing availability of nuclear-weapons-related technologies spread by black-market networks.1 As outlined in the introduction to this dossier, IAEA standard safeguards are designed to detect in a timely manner the diversion of nuclear material from declared nuclear facilities. Diverting material from declared and safeguarded fuel-cycle facilities is difficult; it is likely that a would-be nuclear-weapons state would construct clandestine facilities as part of a parallel secret programme. The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, even with the strengthening provisions of the Additional Protocol, varies according to the type of facility in question. Nuclear power plants themselves are relatively straightforward to safeguard. Detecting diversion at facilities which handle large quantities of liquids, gases or powders (known as bulk-handling facilities), such as full-scale enrichment or reprocessing plants, is more of a challenge. Detecting the existence of small clandestine gas-centrifuge enrichment plants is the greatest challenge. Unlike reactors or reprocessing plants, such facilities produce very few environmental emissions or other transmissible signatures, and so can be extremely difficult to detect. Enrichment plants can also be housed in small and nondescript facilities, or buried underground, and thus can be hard to discern from overhead imagery. A state that complements a nuclear-reactor programme with such sensitive fuel-cycle technologies (which could be replicated in secret) thus presents a possible proliferation concern. In the event that a violation is detected, any enforcement actions are at the discretion of the IAEA board of governors and the United Nations Security Council. The efficacy of the system for ensuring compliance with safeguards agreements is therefore dependent on the effectiveness of IAEA safeguards, the mechanisms for agreeing on enforcement actions and the enforcement actions themselves.