Congestion phenomena caused by matching pennies in evolutionary games
نویسندگان
چکیده
Evolutionary social dilemma games are extended by an additional matching-pennies game that modifies the collected payoffs. In a spatial version players are distributed on a square lattice and interact with their neighbors. First, we show that the matching-pennies game can be considered as the microscopic force of the Red Queen effect that breaks the detailed balance and induces eddies in the microscopic probability currents if the strategy update is analogous to the Glauber dynamics for the kinetic Ising models. The resulting loops in probability current breaks symmetry between the chessboardlike arrangements of strategies via a bottleneck effect occurring along the four-edge loops in the microscopic states. The impact of this congestion is analogous to the application of a staggered magnetic field in the Ising model; that is, the order-disorder critical transition is wiped out by noise. It is illustrated that the congestion induced symmetry breaking can be beneficial for the whole community within a certain region of parameters.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Physical review. E, Statistical, nonlinear, and soft matter physics
دوره 91 3 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015