Biological adaptation , rational action , and symbolism

Political science, as a discipline, has been reluctant to adopt theories and methodologies developed in fields studying human behavior from an evolutionary standpoint. I ask whether evolutionary concepts are reconcilable with standard political-science theories and whether those concepts help solve puzzles to which these theories classically are applied. I find that evolutionary concepts readily and simultaneously accommodate theories of rational choice, symbolism, interpretation, and acculturation. Moreover, phenomena perennially hard to explain in standard political science become clearer when human interactions are understood in light of natural selection and evolutionary psychology. These phenomena include the political and economic effects of emotion, status, personal attractiveness, and variations in information-processing and decision-making under uncertainty; exemplary is the use of ‘‘focal points’’ in multiple-equilibrium games. I conclude with an overview of recent research by, and ongoing debates among, scholars analyzing politics in evolutionarily sophisticated terms. T hat human beings have evolved by natural selection is broadly accepted. That lessons of evolution should inform theories of human behavior is far less broadly accepted, notably so in political science and economics. Resistance to evolutionary thought in these fields has several partial explanations, including methodological ones, but is largely the legacy of one error, the naturalistic fallacy, whereby an ‘‘is’’ of nature becomes an ‘‘ought’’ of morality, as it did notoriously in Social Darwinism and the Eugenics Movement. Would theories employed by political scientists and economists — and political-economists, for that matter — perform better if lessons of evolutionary psychology were made endogenous? The premise of this question is in some respects new, even in biopolitics. I am not asking whether genetic or gene-expression factors are behaviorally consequential or whether some rarely considered variable, such as low-level neurotoxicant exposure, is more often influential than commonly imagined. Nor do I mean to suggest that evolutionary theory has been ignored uniformly; it has not. Rather than trying to add or replace a theory, I propose to dissect and enhance one: rational-choice theory, upon which economics and, increasingly, political science rely. On its surface, rational-choice theory might seem incompatible with evolutionary theory. 5 Yet rationality itself has evolved, as has emotionality. I proceed by first covering some significant theoretical issues involving types of explanation. Specifically, I review the general type of explanation natural selection embodies — functionalism — and compare it to the type of explanation the rational-choice school offers: intentionalism. We can alleviate some of the difficulties encountered in intentionalist explanations by drawing on the evolutionist’s functional explanation. I also suggest that rational-choice understanding of the symbolic and political dimensions of social processes help evolutionary theory conceptualize the 23 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES d 20 JANUARY 2007 d VOL. 25, NO. 1-2 role of social environment in shaping behavior. I then cover several empirical phenomena that should be of special interest to political scientists and economists. Finally, I outline the limitations of my approach and offer suggestions for future empirical and theoretical work. While I am principally concerned with the study of politics, my interest in rational-choice theory requires considering economic literatures. Indeed, economists have done much of the pioneering work on developing rational-choice theory in an evolutionary context and the unique contributions of this paper build on those efforts. Types of explanation Explanations of particular phenomena, whether they be decisions to vote or why the peacock has evolved a highly decorative tail, differ not only in what is being explained but also in how it is being explained. A poorly chosen explanatory type might hypothesize causal relations that do not exist, exclude pivotal variables, or apply ineffective tests. Jon Elster characterizes a functional explanation in the following manner: an institution or behavioral pattern, X, is explained by its function, Y, for a group, Z, if and only if: 1) Y is an effect of X. 2) Y is beneficial for Z. 3) Y is unintended by the actors producing X. 4) Y — or at least the causal relation between X and Y — is unrecognized by the actors in Z. 5) Y maintains X by a causal feedback loop passing through Z. Daniel Little describes functional explanations as those putting the explandum (that which is to be explained) in terms of its consequences ( i.e., we explain the cause of something by the presence of the effect). The biological theory of natural selection is a commonly accepted use of functional explanation. Psychological or physiological features of an organism are explained by their contribution to successful reproduction that in turn produces more organisms with the beneficial features in the future. If the function (Y) of the behavioral pattern (X) is effective (not effective) given the current environment, the feedback loop (natural selection) works to increase (decrease) the prevalence of the behavioral pattern (X). The natural selection explanation used in biology is not goal-directed. Evolution works by a process of local maximization, where adaptations are evaluated only in terms of the current environment. Future effects of an adaptation are unknown, and no waiting process permits ‘‘better’’ adaptations to be selected in a later time period that would, otherwise, be unavailable if a current adaptation is selected. Evolution is a myopic process and cannot be considered teleological. 9 Elster and Little maintain that successful functional explanations in the social sciences are uncommon because they rarely demonstrate the causal feedback loop connecting an effect to its cause. That is, scholars rarely specify a mechanism (like natural selection) that increases or decreases the prevalence of some social behavior or institutional arrangement. Instead, an assumption is made that if certain benefits accrue to some social behavior, then these benefits satisfy the needs of those within the system of norms or institutions. This is not a well-specified explanation. Just because they may be discernible, benefits do not explain their own cause. Little notes, ‘‘(t)he fact that the system of norms is best for the group as a whole is not sufficient to explain the existence and reproduction of the normative system that would produce those benefits. To assume otherwise is to implicitly assume what we might call the principle of Panglossian functionalism — the expectation that those social arrangements will emerge with a given social setting that best satisfy the needs of the group affected.’’ A priori, we have no reason to assume our social institutions are optimal. Furthermore, functionalist explanation lends to a static conception of social institutions because it is hard pressed to show how conflicting interests are incorporated into the explanation. 12 Without demonstrating mechanisms (feedback loops) that sustain some practice, alternative benefits to some institution or social behavior — potentially to a subset of actors — and thus alternative explanations, cannot be ruled out. Such a strategy is inconclusive. 14 The natural-selection mechanism that regulates the prevalence of a feature in a species is well understood. In the social sciences, mechanisms are less clear. Intentionalist explanations address this problem by specifying three factors: actions (strategies), desires (preferences), and beliefs. ‘‘An intentional agent chooses an action that he believes will be a means to his goal.’’ While intentional explanations can take several Tingley 24 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES d 20 JANUARY 2007 d VOL. 25, NO. 1-2 different forms, the most prominent has been rationalchoice theory, with its models of strategic (not parametric) decision-making: actors choose actions altered by what they think others will do. Collective social outcomes may thus be explained and predicted in terms of individual rational decisions. 17 Asking ‘‘Who wants specific benefits?’’ and ‘‘How do agents generate and maintain benefits?’’ treats individual actors as if they intentionally select beneficial norms. This violates Elster’s third agent principle (that agents do not intend the function of the norm) and the fourth agent principle (that specific function is unrecognized). In this sense, we might think of intentionalist and well specified functionalist explanations on a continuum of causal explanations, differing by the extent to which Elster’s third and fourth principles of functional explanation are relaxed. Indeed, Elster’s strict separation of functional and intentional explanations has been questioned. So, can we deploy functional explanations of human psychological or physiological traits alongside explanations that include purposeful, or goal-oriented, action? Elster repeatedly questions whether ‘‘sociobiology’’ (a term typically avoided in modern evolutionary writing) is useful for explaining human behavior. 21, 22, 23 However, he appears to consider evolutionary explanations in isolation from other types of explanation. An explanatory consilience, with evolutionary analysis complementing rational-choice theory, may help stabilize our explanatory framework. Such a consilience has long been stymied because evolutionists have not been studying goal-directed processes, whereas social scientists have been. While stating assumptions, postulating reasonable mechanisms, and working with formal logic are desirable properties of a scientific enterprise, rational-choice explanations are still belayed by considerable difficulties and limitations. 25 One line of criticism is that a ‘‘thin’’ theory of rational decision making, which abstractly identifies beliefs, desires, and actions through a formal (mathematical) representation, is at most marginally helpful because it does not incorporate the cultures, norms, values, et cetera, characterizing the empirical world the social sciences study. Answeringly identifies beliefs, desires, and actions through a formal (mathematical) representation, is at most marginally helpful because it does not incorporate the cultures, norms, values, et cetera, characterizing the empirical world the social sciences study. Answering this criticism, some rational-choice theorists have drawn on interpretive methodologies, such as ethnography, while trying to avoid the ‘‘hermeneutic circle’’ that lent many in the interpretive tradition (e.g., the anthropologist Clifford Geertz) to reject the generalizability sought by many in the rational-choice movement. The connection between these ‘‘thicker’’ rational-choice approaches and interpretive methods is relatively straightforward, though certainly not prominent in either epistemic community. ‘‘To understand individual meanings and actions it is necessary to interpret them, and to understand social practices it is necessary to understand the meanings and values that their participants attribute to them. Interpretation of individual action may take a variety of forms, either as goal-directed action or as symbolic participatory action.’’ These interpretations allow preferences, beliefs, and strategies to be specified in relation to real decision-makers and cultural contexts, 28, 29, 30 though even these approaches have drawn more conventional critiques. 32 This ‘‘thicker’’ form of rationalchoice explanation, and the more abstract ‘‘thin’’ account, can be improved by incorporating insights from evolutionary psychology and cognitive sciences. Beyond asking what actor preferences, strategies, and beliefs are, we must ask how specific actors came to obtain them. Strict rational-choice theorists omit this second question, dismissing all its possible answers as exogenous. Evolutionary theory accepts these answers as endogenous, even in analyses otherwise observing rational-choice conventions. ‘‘Thicker’’ rational-choice theories ultimately rest upon 1) relevant local conditions, including cultural resources such as symbols, identities, and values; 2) processes dynamically governing the formation and change of these conditions; and 3) the processing and manipulating of whatever information may be contained therein. Holding preferences, strategies, and beliefs exogenous can generate problematic explanations of behavior. 34 Insights from the human cognitive sciences, including behavioral psychology, inform each of these areas, especially the third. For example, how do neurological characteristics affect how, and to what extent, agents consciously navigate the social world around them? 36, 37 How does emotion influence decision-making, and how does our understanding of affective process suggest we ought to analyze political and economic phenomena? 39 These are important issues for political scientists, but conventional theories are hard-pressed to clarify them. Absent empirical and theoretical work on human cognitive and emotional characteristics, theories of human social behavior can Evolving political science 25 POLITICS AND THE LIFE SCIENCES d 20 JANUARY 2007 d VOL. 25, NO. 1-2 easily become — and remain — idealized, some veering to the optimistic, some to the pessimistic. In the next section, I dissect the standard rationalchoice approach and discuss how each part of the intentionalist explanation (desires, beliefs, and actions) unnecessarily relies on a faulty model of human behavior dubbed by evolutionary psychologists the ‘‘Standard Social Science Model’’ (SSSM). I show that intentionalist explanations can fruitfully draw on an evolutionary understanding of human political and economic behavior. Reciprocally, I argue that a rational-choice account of culture — an account stressing the explicitly political nature of culture — helps remedy explanatory problems faced by evolutionary psychologists. An evolutionist’s critique of rational-choice theory Albert Somit and Steven Peterson argue that the prominence of rational-choice work in political science, compared to their ‘‘biopolitics,’’ can partially be attributed to how rational-choice theory uses the familiar assumption that social forces are dominant in explaining what people want and how they pursue their desires — all according to the SSSM. 42 Despite the controversies it has created within other social-science research traditions, rational-choice theory still ascribes to the view that almost all human behavior is learned through (or explained by) an individual’s social environment. I argue that rational-choice approaches do not need to rely exclusively on the SSSM. To show this I consider each component of the rational-choice explanation: preferences, beliefs, and strategies. I deal with equilibrium concepts (how one solves a gametheoretic problem) in the second half of this paper.