2 The Vickrey - Clarke - Groves ( VCG ) Mechanism
نویسنده
چکیده
3 Examples of VCG mechanisms 5 3.1 Single-item auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.2 Auctions of identical items . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.3 Procurement auctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 3.4 Public project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 3.5 Paths in a network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
منابع مشابه
Sequential mechanism design
In the customary VCG (Vickrey-Clarke-Groves) mechanism truth-telling is a dominant strategy. In this paper we study the sequential VCG mechanism and show that other dominant strategies may then exist. We illustrate how this fact can be used to minimize taxes using examples concerned with Clarke tax and public projects.
متن کاملExploring the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Electricity Markets
Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are procured through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. ...
متن کاملExploring Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Mechanism for Electricity Markets
Control reserves are power generation or consumption entities that ensure balance of supply and demand of electricity in real-time. In many countries, they are operated through a market mechanism in which entities provide bids. The system operator determines the accepted bids based on an optimization algorithm. We develop the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism for these electricity markets. ...
متن کاملVickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) Auctions
A VCG auction (named after their inventors Vickrey, Clarke, and Groves) is a generalization of the single-good, second price Vickrey auction to the case of a combinatorial auction (multiple goods, from which any participant can bid on each possible combination). We formalize in this entry VCG auctions, including tie-breaking and prove that the functions for the allocation and the price determin...
متن کاملVCG Redistribution with Gross Substitutes
For the problem of allocating resources among multiple strategic agents, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, strategy-proof, and it never incurs a deficit. However, in general, under the VCG mechanism, payments flow out of the system of agents, which reduces the agents’ utilities. VCG redistribution mechanisms aim to return as much of the VCG payments as possible ...
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