Decentralized College Admissions
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study decentralized college admissions with uncertain student preferences. Colleges strategically admit students likely to be overlooked by competitors. Highly ranked students may receive fewer admissions or have a higher chance of receiving no admissions than those ranked below. When students’ attributes are multidimensional, colleges avoid head-on competition by placing excessive weight on school-specific attributes such as essays. Restricting the number of applications or wait-listing alleviates enrollment uncertainty, but the outcomes are inefficient and unfair. A centralized matching via Gale and Shapley’s deferred acceptance algorithm attains efficiency and fairness but may make some colleges worse off than under decentralized matching.
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A Supply and Demand Model of the College Admissions
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Before proceeding, we make the following observations: First, for each student, applying to a college dominates not applying at all. Second, since a student does not know the score and the student’s preference is independent of the score, the student’s application depends solely on the preference. Third, since each student’s preference depends on the state, the mass of students applying to each...
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متن کاملfor “ Decentralized College Admissions ”
where the the last inequality holds since mA(s) < mA(1) for s < 1. Note that A benefits from the deviation since it admits more students without exceeding its capacity. Similarly, if mA(0) > κ, then A can benefit by rejecting mA(0) − κ of students. Thus, we must have mA(0) ≤ κ ≤ mA(1) in equilibrium. Step 2. In equilibrium, there is a unique ŝi ∈ (0, 1), for i = A,B, such that mi(ŝi) = κ. Proof...
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