Global Information Technology Pressure and Government Accountability: The Mediating Effect of Domestic Context on Website Openness

To what extent and in what ways does the global information technology revolution affect the openness and accountability of public organizations? Adopting a model of the effects of global pressure on public bureaucracy (Welch and Wong 1998) as the theoretical framework, this study combines two streams of research and sources of data—the Cyberspace Policy Research Group's (CyPRG) comparative analysis of website openness and Ferrel Heady's (1996) classification of the major dimensions of civil service systems—to test hypotheses about how the domestic context, as relevant to national civil service systems, mediates the effect of the global information technology (IT) pressure on government accountability in eight countries. Government accountability, as measured by website openness, increased over time. Nevertheless, while the global pressure of information technology leads to more government accountability at the global level, the domestic context leads to variations in the rates of adoption and effects of the global pressure at the national level. Conditions of high autonomy, high complexity, and low professionalism exacerbate the tendencies of bureaucrats to control information to consolidate power. These findings confirm the importance of the domestic context, particularly the civil service systems, in mediating the effect of global pressure. To what extent does the global information technology revolution affect the openness and transparency of bureaucracies? And in what ways does the domestic context of nations determine the willingness or ability of bureaucrats to be accountable to J-PART ll(2001):4:509-538 citizens through the use of information technology? Comparison 509/Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability of any two countries inevitably identifies differences in the value and expression of accountability in government (Peters 1995, 290-91). However, in the absence of a good theoretical framework or a natural experiment research context, even reliable cross-national measurement of dependent and independent variables often makes such comparisons unmanageably messy at best. An identifiable set of global institutions, technologies, and values now exists that is adopted by bureaucracies worldwide and is measurable across nations (Welch and Wong 1998). In addition, comparative administration research has resurged, giving the field a set of comparative tools that may be applied globally (Heady 1996). This study combines two streams of research— the Cyberspace Policy Research Group's (CyPRG) comparative analysis of website openness and Ferrel Heady's (1966) classification of the major dimensions of civil service systems—to test hypotheses about how the domestic context, as associated with the national civil systems, mediates the effect of the global information technology (IT) pressure on government accountability. Ensuing sections of this article include a theoretical framework for analysis of the effect of global pressures on bureaucratic change, a literature review on information technology and accountability, hypotheses predicting the effect of domestic context on website openness, data and methods, findings, and discussion. '"CyPRG is [a research group] based at the University of Arizona, Tucson and George Mason University that conducts research on the diffusion and use of the World Wide Web (WWW) in national governments worldwide. Openness and internal effectiveness are of particular interest. Every year CyPRG scans the web for new agency sites across the globe, records agency URLs and other pertinent information, and organizes comprehensive database of all national level government agencies on the Web. In addition, CyPRG analyzes web operations according to a number of criteria of interest to citizens, public managers, and policymakers" (CyPRG 2001a). COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF GLOBAL PRESSURES ON BUREAUCRATIC CHANGE For public bureaucracies worldwide, globalization represents a set of complex and interactive stimuli, demands, and opportunities that exist in the organizational environment but are not specifically associated with a particular nation. Because organizations are open systems (Selnick 1966; Thompson 1967; Aldrich 1979; Rainey 1998; Scott 1998), global pressures such as multinational agreements or the information technology revolution affect the structure and behavior of public organizations (Welch and Wong 1998). Research in comparative public administration and globalization suggests that while global pressures place similar demands on public organizations worldwide, the patterns of adoption and organizational change are discernable and depend significantly on the domestic context surrounding the public bureaucracy (Aberbach, Putnam, and Rockman 1981; Riggs 1994; Heady 1995; Welch and Wong 1998; Farazmand 1999). Accordingly, this study utilizes a previously developed comparative 510//-PARr, October 2001 Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability Exhibit 1 Model of Effects of Global Pressure on Bureaucratic Change Domestic Context • Political • Social • Economic FEEDBACK Adopted from Welch and Wong 1998. term domestic context is chosen to provide flexible interpretation of location. It is not limited to administrative jurisdiction but can be based on geographical, cultural, or some other useful boundary distinction. In die case of administrative jurisdiction, domestic can refer to national, regional, local, or some other administrative delineation. This flexibility will enable the model to be extended to the analysis of regional administrative systems. framework for assessing the effect of global pressures on bureaucratic change (Welch and Wong 1998; see exhibit 1). The framework shows that global pressures affect public organizations directly and indirecdy through domestic contexts. Despite significant variation in the structures and processes of public organizations worldwide, global pressures create common exigencies upon bureaucracies that result in predictable reactions or changes by public organizations. Moreover, the model suggests that elements of the domestic context filter the effects of global pressures in predictable ways. As a result, the domestic context either offsets or reinforces the change induced by the global pressure on public bureaucracy. The analysis of the effects of global pressures on nations is often viewed as contributing to the debate on convergence theory: institutions in different countries, including die public bureaucracy, tend to converge to a common pattern (OECD 1993 and 1995; Cheung 1997; Ketd 1997; Doremus et al. 1998; Hallenberg and Basinger 1998). Research to date shows that evidence for convergence probably depends on the policy area analyzed and the level of abstraction of the comparison (Scharpf 1997). We agree with Scharpf on the importance of gaining insight from well-defined empirical studies. As we will show, the interesting questions are less about convergence per se and more about the contextual or domestic factors that influence national-level administrative change toward or away from the global trends. 511//-PART, October 2001 Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability Using the framework as a guide, we seek to determine how die domestic context of public agencies affects the openness of websites, where establishment of a website represents adoption of a global information technology and change in the level of website openness represents the revealed level of change in accountability of the agency. It will be shown that domestic context intervenes in predictable ways to enhance or limit the level of agency accountability. GLOBAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PRESSURE AND PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY Global information technology (IT) pressure on public organizations drives procurement, application, and accountability. Pressure for IT procurement and application is felt by all nations due to the increased availability of information globally, improved data collection techniques, and demand for processing capacity. Procurement of new hardware and software provides bureaucracies with the physical capacity to acquire, store, and use information to improve measurement, innovation, and problem solving (Kraemer, Dedrick, and King 1995). Acquisition and application of information technology is also driven by political and economic demands. Politically, governments increasingly are signatories to global conventions and agreements that require sophisticated data collection and analysis capacities. Additionally, public officials and political groups must be knowledgeable about how global trends and issues affect their nations (Public Management Service 1999). Economically, application of information technology has been linked to increases in productivity and growth (Kraemer and Dedrick 1999). Global transactions hold natural barriers to trust that information disclosure can help dissolve (Farazmand 1999; Public Management Service 1999). For all these reasons, increases in training, access, and use of information technology are thought to provide national benefits. Others see a growing trend in citizen empowerment and accountability enhancement resulting from access to information and interaction with government (Kahlin 1997; La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak 1999). Disclosure or availability of information is also a symbol of trust, modernity, and global citizenship that may be necessary for competitive vitality of the nation, political legitimacy, or may be due to otiher incentives such as cooperativeness (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Strang and Meyer 1993). Welch and Wong (1998) show that global information technology pressure can expose public organization tendencies toward accountability. For example, officials in nondemocratic countries may try to control access to information flows across 512/J-PART, October 2001 Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability global technologies such as the World Wide Web to enhance local power and autonomy. The challenge for research on accountability in public administration is that many of the expectations for performance are multiple, changing, and contradictory, making measurement difficult (Romzek and Dubnick 1987; Johnston and Romzek 1999). Accountability involves relationships in which a public organization is held to answer for its performance (Johnston and Romzek 1999). It is further specified into accountability to and accountability for dimensions. Public organizations are ultimately accountable to the citizenry. Under the paradigm of new public management reform, the focus of accountability for has been shifted from "process" to "outcome" (Bardach and Lesser 1996). J3oth dimensions identify a significant relationship between openness of public organizations and government accountability. In this era of globalization, accountability is not only important in the relationship between citizenry and government at the domestic level, it is also an internationally important issue. As states become increasingly interdependent, multinational institutions are becoming more important mechanisms for resolving problems of collective action, high transaction costs, and information deficits or asymmetries (Martin and Simmons 1998). A major problem of collaboration concerns the structure of incentives for compliance (Mitchell 1994). States defect for a variety of reasons including low national benefits, concerns of free riding, and fears of reprisals. A high level of transparency in a compliance system allows effective monitoring and provides a basis for sanctions that forces signatories and members of cooperative agreements to be internationally accountable (Jervis 1985; Mitchell 1994). Monitoring of the performance and compliance of each country is further enhanced when domestic institutions are more transparent (Cowhey 1993; Martin and Simmons 1998). While effective international organization often has its own compliance system, transparency in domestic institutions provides alternative channels for information collection and verification. Therefore, greater transparency in public organizations can lead to higher accountability at both domestic and international levels, to both citizens and member states of international organizations. The Cyberspace Policy Research Group further develops this relationship between openness and accountability in its comparative research of websites. CyPRG defines government websites openness to be a function of two factors: transparency and interactivity. Transparency refers to the extent to which an organization reveals work and decision processes and procedures. In terms of a website, transparency "constitutes a layman's basic 513/ J-PART, October 2001 Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability map of the organization as depicted in the information on the site [and] reveals the depth of access it allows, the depths of knowledge about processes it is willing to reveal, and the level of attention to citizen response it provides" (La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak 1999). A more transparent government allows citizens to monitor the performance of public organization more easily through the increase in the availability of information (Reichard 1998). Interactivity refers to the quality of communication between agency and citizen. " [It] is a measure of the level of convenience or degree of immediate feedback [provided]" (La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak 1999). A more interactive public organization enhances accountability by being more responsive to the preferences of the citizenry. CyPRG hypothesizes that higher levels of interactivity and transparency indicate a lower level of managerial control in public organizations (CyPRG 2001b). Lower levels of control are also expected to result in greater organizational effectiveness as managers are more inclined to allow greater flexibility for problem solving. Importantly, CyPRG also hypothesizes that lower levels of control (greater openness) are associated with greater accountability (La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak 1999). Because our initial thinking on the effects of the global pressure of information technology on accountability is similar to CyPRG constructs (Welch and Wong 1998), in this article we adopt CyPRG definitions and measures of openness and utilize CyPRG data that is publicly available. We will now move to an analysis of Heady's classification of civil service systems as a means for determining how domestic context affects changes in accountability over time. THE MEDIATING EFFECTS OF DOMESTIC CONTEXT ON OPENNESS The global effects framework indicates that economic, political, and social systems are fundamental elements of a domestic context that affect the expression of global pressures in public bureaucracies. Nevertheless, research that has used many of the more direct measures of these three broad constructs to explain variation in the openness of agency websites has resulted in weak findings. One reason may be that many of the direct measures are highly correlated and often lead to serious multicollinearity problems (La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak 1999). Importantly, the direct-measure approach appears to provide only limited causal insight (La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak 1999). For example, to test eight theory-based hypotheses the CyPRG team used such variables as national income, central government expenditures, integration with the world economy, science, 5WJ-PART, October 2001 La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak separated the data set into two subsamples: OECD countries and non-OECD countries. The adjusted R-square for the OECD countries in the full model is 18.9 percent and that of the non-OECD countries is 30.3 percent. Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability research and education, computers and Internet hosts, cultural values, democracy, and legal system. None of the variables were found to be significant in the full model while more parsimonious models revealed that national income is related to openness. Overall, only those hypotheses relating to national income or wealth have a bearing on openness in both OECD and non-OECD countries, either directly or via computer ownership. . . . None of the other hypotheses are supported by this data. Therefore, even though we find reasonably robust results for a link between openness and national income, we still do not have a very satisfying explanation of its sources. National income only explains about a quarter of the variance observed in openness scores, and we do not know what it is about national income or wealth that produces more open government organizations. The wide variety of more specific proposed mechanisms all fail to predict the pattern we observe in the data (La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak 1999, 16). Because of the limitations identified in previous studies, we will adopt Heady's framework (1996) that classifies national civil service systems on five dimensions: relation to political regime, socioeconomic context, focus for personnel management, qualification requirements, and sense of mission. This framework is particularly attractive because it focuses on the interaction among the political, economic, and social dimensions of the domestic context as they pertain to the civil service, which may be more appropriate than the direct measures discussed. We expect that measures of these complex and nuanced dimensions will help explain how the domestic context can affect the bureaucratic behavior as measured by the change in website openness. The following sections address each of Heady's five dimensions in turn as they relate to website openness and accountability. Relationship of Regime and Civil Service The relationship between the civil service and the political regime addresses the independent power of the civil service. This dimension ranges from the lowest level of independent power under a ruler responsive regime, to progressively higher levels under single party responsive, majority party responsive, and military responsive. Ruler responsive describes a context in which political power resides in the hands of a ruler or ruling group that exercises legitimate control over the civil service system. In this system, bureaucrats are controlled and have little discretion to make public policy. In single party regimes the civil service is subservient to a dominant political party in a system in which political competition is minimal (e.g., communist regimes). In majority party regimes, where competition among political parties is the norm, the civil service is responsive to the governing party. Parliamentary systems control the civil service 515/J-PART, October 2001 Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability more directly dian presidentialist systems due to the lack of competition between executive and legislative branches. Competition in presidentialist systems results in more-diffuse streams of policy direction. Military responsive regimes describe systems in which military rulers operate uie country in coalition with their junior partners, the civil service. Collaboration insuring success of the regime implies dependence of rulers on the administrative and policy-making ability of civil servants. In a global environment in which power is leaking from national institutions to global institutions (Cleveland 1993; Farazmand 1999), national political regimes may seek to maintain their power bases. This situation leads to politicians' resistance to efforts to increase information disclosure (Reichard 1998). Bureaucracies that are more dependent upon the political regime for power are more likely to control information in response to political demands. One outcome of the general trend will be to reduce uie level of openness of the government websites. This reasoning can be formalized by the following hypomesis. Hypothesis 1: The greater the independent power of the civil service, uie more accountable the government will become under global information pressure. Alternatively, it may be true that much higher levels of independence lead bureaucrats to control information disclosure and limit interaction with external groups as a means of maintaining their own power. Therefore, it is possible that instead of a linear relationship between dependence and accountability, a nonlinear relationship exists in which high levels of dependence and independence lead to reduced levels of accountability while moderate levels of independence lead to higher levels of accountability. We state the competing hypothesis below. Hypothesis 2: Higher levels of dependence and independence of the civil service lead to reductions in accountability while a moderate level of independence leads to increases in accountability (a U-shaped curve). Qualification Requirements Qualification requirements refer to the degree of involvement by bureaucrats in decisions about their own qualification requirements. Civil service systems are categorized patrimonial where political rulers determine qualification requirements. Increasing levels of civil service power to determine qualifications are evident under party loyalty, party patronage, 5WJ-PART, October 2001 Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability professional performance, and bureaucratic determination subcategories. Where party loyalty signifies an important qualification, bureaucrats show allegiance as a prerequisite to service, while party patronage service qualification requires simultaneous and equal allegiance to party support and public work. Professional performance describes systems in which technical competence and socialized neutrality are primary qualifications, and bureaucratic determination identifies those systems in which bureaucrats determine professional and performance standards. In a global environment, civil service systems that allow managers little decision-making autonomy over qualification requirements also allow little general decision-making autonomy. There exists greater room for managerial discretion in systems where political standards are relatively less prevalent and professional standards are relatively more important. Widely accepted objective standards and professional values provide justification for action. However, in systems where discretion is low and political standards are prevalent, government organizations will limit or reduce their adoption of global standards and professional values of accountability or openness. This reasoning is written formally into the following hypothesis. Hypothesis 3: Civil service systems in which bureaucrats have greater ability to determine qualification requirements will be more likely to increase government accountability as a result of global information pressure. Alternatively, it may be true that much higher levels of bureaucratic power may also lead to behavior that limits external evaluation of decisions in order to maintain power. High concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucracy causes centralization and control of information by the bureaucracy to secure power. We express this nonlinear relationship in the following hypothesis. Hypothesis 4: High and low levels of ability of bureaucrats in determining qualification requirements lead to reductions in accountability while moderate levels of ability increase in accountability as a result of global information pressure (a U-shaped curve). Socioeconomlc Context Socioeconomic system refers generally to the role of state in society as determined by the approach to decision making in the polity. This dimension ranges from minimal role of the state 517IJ-PART, October 2001 Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability under a traditional system to progressively higher roles under pluralist competitive, mixed, corporatist, and centrally planned decision-making structures. Under a traditional system, civil servants are bound by tradition requiring obedience to the leader. Hence bureaucrats in this setting are relatively passive. Pluralist competitive systems depend significantly on outcomes from market forces and competition among individuals and groups as a basis for socioeconomic decision making. Corporatist socioeconomic systems place the state in a central decision-making role where it is the state that mediates the roles of competing groups. Mixed systems fall in between pluralist competitive and corporatist categories. Civil servants hold the greatest decisionmaking role relative to the other groups in centrally planned systems, which are traditionally void of political pluralism and illegitimate interest groups. Because control over information is one way that nations can maintain power, national polities will resist disclosure and openness to limit leakage of power under globalization (Cleveland 1993; Kraemer and Dedrick 1997; Welch and Wong 2000). Public managers in domestic systems in which the role of the civil service is passive and obedient will be less likely and less politically able to increase openness and accountability. However, managers who operate in open systems are subject to the pressures of globally accepted institutions and norms where openness is increasingly a symbol of trust, modernity, and global citizenship (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Strang and Meyer 1993). Therefore, it is expected that managers with a greater policymaking role will, over time, increase openness and move toward greater accountability. Hypothesis 5: The greater the role of the state in society, the more likely government organizations will increase accountability levels under global information pressure. Alternatively, it may be true that in nations where the role of the state is very high, there may be an expectation by citizens or by tradition that the state and the bureaucracy know best. Public managers in domestic systems where the policy-making role of civil servants is greater may seek greater information control as a source of power (Reichard 1998). Therefore, an alternative hypothesis follows. Hypothesis 6: High and low levels of state role lead to reductions in accountability while moderate levels of state role lead to increases in accountability under global information pressure (a U-shaped curve). 518//-PARr, October 2001 Global IT Pressure and Government Accountability Focus for Personnel Management Focus for personnel management describes the extent to which personnel decisions are centralized in the nation, and hence the extent to which the civil service system is centralized. This dimension identifies four categories—chief executive, independent agency, divided, and ministry-by-ministry—and ranges from highly centralized to decentralized decision making. The chief executive category describes a system in which the ruling individual or party directly controls selection and behavior of civil servants. Independent agency refers to systems in which personnel management is a politically isolated agency. The divided category identifies those civil service systems in which some functions, such as initial recruitment or training, are handled by one agency while other functions are handled by other agencies. The greatest form of decentralization of personnel systems is delineated by the ministry-by-ministry category in which ministry or department heads control personnel decisions. This usually occurs in political systems where the ruling elite controls "appointment, retention, and behavior of ministry or department heads" (Heady 1996, 216). Nations in which civil service systems are highly centralized are also less able to develop flexible agency-by-agency responses to complex situations. A large number of rules, regulations, and norms of conduct associated with centralization restrict managerial ability to creatively adapt organizational systems to change. In a global context, global change toward greater openness will be reflected in more effectively and functionally decentralized and less structurally differentiated systems than in centralized systems (Demchak, Friis, and La Porte 1998; La Porte, de Jong, and Demchak 1999). The following statement formalizes this expectation. Hypothesis 7: The greater the extent to which personnel decisions are decentralized, the more likely global information pressure will lead to increases in accountability.