Hierarchical Simple Games: Weightedness and Structural Characterization

نویسندگان

  • Tatiana Gvozdeva
  • Ali Hameed
  • Arkadii Slinko
چکیده

In many situations, both in human and artificial societies, cooperating agents have different status with respect to the activity and it is not uncommon that certain actions are only allowed to coalitions that satisfy certain criteria, e.g., to sufficiently large coalitions or coalitions which involve players of sufficient seniority. Simmons (1988) formalized this idea in the context of secret sharing schemes by defining the concept of a (disjunctive) hierarchical access structure. Tassa (2007) introduced their conjunctive counterpart. From the game theory perspective access structures in secret sharing schemes are simple games. In this paper we prove the duality between disjunctive and conjunctive hierarchical games. We introduce a canonical representation theorem for both types of hierarchical games and characterize disjunctive ones as complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing coalition. We give a short combinatorial proof of the Beimel-Tassa-Weinreb (2008) characterization of weighted disjunctive hierarchical games. By duality we get similar theorems for conjunctive hierarchical games.

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

منابع مشابه

Weightedness and structural characterization of hierarchical simple games

In this paper we give structural charaterizations for disjunctive and conjunctive hierarchical simple games by characterizing them as complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing and, respectively, shift-minimal winning coalitions. We prove canonical representation theorems for both types of hierarchical games and establish duality between them. We characterize those disjunctive and conjun...

متن کامل

Weighted and roughly weighted simple games

This paper contributes to the program of numerical characterisation and classification of simple games outlined in the classical monograph of von Neumann and Morgenstern [22]. One of the most fundamental questions of this program is what makes a simple game a weighted majority game. The necessary and sufficient conditions that guarantee weightedness were obtained by Elgot [3] and refined by Tay...

متن کامل

Voting games with abstention: Linking completeness and weightedness

Weighted games for several levels of approval in input and output were introduced in [9]. An extension of the desirability relation for simple games, called the influence relation, was introduced for games with several levels of approval in input in [24] (see also [18]). However, there are weighted games not being complete for the influence relation, something different to what occurs for simpl...

متن کامل

On the complexity of problems on simple games

Simple games cover voting systems in which a single alternative, such as a bill or an amendment, is pitted against the status quo. A simple game or a yes-no voting system is a set of rules that specifies exactly which collections of “yea” votes yield passage of the issue at hand. Each of these collections of “yea” voters forms a winning coalition. We are interested in performing a complexity an...

متن کامل

Roughly Weighted Hierarchical Simple Games

Hierarchical simple games both disjunctive and conjunctive are natural generalizations of simple majority games. They take their origin in the theory of secret sharing. Another important generalization of simple majority games with origin in economics and politics are weighted and roughly weighted majority games. In this paper we characterize roughly weighted hierarchical games identifying wher...

متن کامل

ذخیره در منابع من


  با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید

برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید

ثبت نام

اگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید

عنوان ژورنال:

دوره   شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2011