Implementation in economies with non-convex production technologies unknown to the designer
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper deals with the problem of incentive mechanism design in non-convex production economies when production sets and preferences both are unknown to the designer. We consider Nash-implementation of loss-free, average cost, marginal cost, voluntary trading, and quantity-taking pricing equilibrium allocations in economies involving increasing returns to scale or more general types of non-convexities. The mechanisms presented in the paper are well-behaved. They are feasible, continuous, and use finite dimensional message spaces. Moreover, the mechanisms work not only for three or more agents, but also for two-agent economies. © 2008 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C72; D51; D61; D71
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 66 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009