Investing in a Shared Supplier in a Competitive Market: Stochastic Capacity Case

W hen firms invest in a shared supplier, one key concern is whether the invested capacity will be used for a competitor. In practice, this concern is addressed by restricting the use of the capacity. We consider what happens when two competing firms invest in a shared supplier. We consider two scenarios that differ in how capacity is used: exclusive capacity and first-priority capacity. We model firms’ investment and production decisions, and analyze the equilibrium outcomes in terms of the number of investing firms and capacity levels for each scenario; realized capacity is a stochastic function of investment levels. We also identify conditions under which the spillover effect occurs, where one firm taps into the other firm’s invested capacity. Although the spillover supposedly intensifies competition, it actually discourages firms’ investment. We also characterize the firms’ and supplier’s preference about the capacity type. While the non-investing firm always prefers spillovers from the first-priority capacity, the investing firm does not always want to shut off the other firm’s access to its leftover capacity, especially when allowing spillover induces the other firm not to invest. The supplier’s preference depends on the trade-off between over-investment and flexibility.