Repeated Signalling Games and Dynamic Trading Relationships
نویسنده
چکیده
A seller of a nondurable good repeatedly faces a buyer who is privately informed about the position of his demand curve. The seller offers a price in each period. The buyer chooses a quantity given the price. The quantity demanded reveals information about the buyer. An equilibrium is characterized with the feature that buyer types separate completely in the first period. This equilibrium uniquely satisfies a modified refinement of the Cho-Kreps criterion. Despite the immediate separation, the buyer distorts his behavior throughout the game. The requirements to signal types can raise the utility of all types of informed players.
منابع مشابه
Reputation : The New Palgrave Dictionary
We explain what reputation effects are, how they arise and the factors that limit or strenghten them. Signalling activity has an increased importance in a dynamic setting because signals sent will affect current and future behavior of other parties; this is called the reputation effect. The literature on reputation has two main themes. The first is that introducing a small amount of incomplete ...
متن کاملGeneral Properties of Long-Run Supergames
Supergames are repeated games in which a fixed known finite one-shot game is repeated over and over. Information about the actions chosen at each stage is provided by a signalling technology. This papers surveys the main properties which are valid over this whole class of games.
متن کاملReputation : The New Palstave Dictionary
We explain what reputation effects are, how they arise and the factors that limit or strengthen them. In a dynamic setting signals sent now may affect the current and future behavior of other players, thus signals can have effects unrelated to their current costs and benefits. It is the interplay between signals and their long run consequences that is studied in the literature on reputation. Th...
متن کاملDynamic system of strategic games
Maybe an event can't be modeled completely through one game but there is more chance with several games. With emphasis on players' rationality, we present new properties of strategic games, which result in production of other games. Here, a new attitude to modeling will be presented in game theory as dynamic system of strategic games and its some applications such as analysis of the clash betwe...
متن کاملZero-Sum Repeated Games: Recent Advances and New Links with Differential Games
The purpose of this survey is to describe some recent advances in zero-sum repeated games and in particular new connections to differential games. Topics include: approachability, asymptotic analysis: recursive formula and operator approach, dual game and incomplete information, uniform approach.
متن کامل