Obviously Strategyproof Implementation of Allocation Mechanisms
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper investigates obviously strategyproof (OSP) implementation of the popular top trading cycles (TTC) and deferred acceptance (DA) mechanisms. Introduced by Li (2016), obvious strategyproofness requires not only that truthful reporting be a dominant strategy, but also that this be obvious to agents who may have limited abilities of contingent reasoning. We characterize the full class of OSP TTC mechanisms for school choice problems using an acyclicity condition on the priority structure. We show that the acyclicity condition is not sufficient for OSP-implementation of DA.
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تاریخ انتشار 2017