Utility without Probability , Aggregation 1 without Interpersonal Comparability : a

10 Most contemporary philosophical discussions of utility either follow the 11 utility representations of von Neumann and Morgenstern that use prob12 ability and the expectation principle to measure individual utilities in a 13 way that leaves zero point and unit undetermined, or assume that psy14 chology can ultimately deliver utility measurement on an absolute scale. 15 From the second point of view utilitarian aggregation is perfectly mean16 ingful, and consequences of utilitarian ethics are straightforward. From 17 the first utilitarian aggregation is perfectly meaningless. We develop a 18 middle position, along the lines suggested by some of Bentham’s ideas. 19 The result is the measurement of individual utilities without the use of 20 probability in a way that is weaker than that envisioned by Bentham 21 but stronger than that given by von Neumann-Morgenstern. In favorable 22 circumstances this allows meaningful aggregation, using a product or ge23 ometric mean, rather than the utilitarian sum. This has consequences for 24 philosophical discussions of utility and utilitarianism. 25 ∗Research for this article was supported by Grant SMA-1416907 from National Science Foundation. †Department of Logic and the Philosophy of Science, University of California, Irvine, Irvine CA92717 USA and Department of Philosophy, Stanford University, Stanford CA94305 USA. ‡Department of Cognitive Sciences University of California, Irvine, Irvine CA92717 USA. IMBS TECHNICAL REPORT 18-01