Contingent Public Support for International Legal Institutions

State cooperation with international institutions requires support from subnational constituencies. We argue that citizens often approve of abstract, foreign actions by institutions, yet disapprove of specific, local actions. We argue this aversion is greatest for citizens in closest “proximity” to institutional actions. We assess these arguments with a survey experiment about the International Criminal Court in Kyrgyzstan a theoretically relevant country with recent, salient civil violence. The survey randomly assigned respondents to a control group, asked about abstract foreign investigations, and a treatment group, asked about an investigation into Kyrgyz violence. Treatment significantly lowered approval for investigations. This effect was strongest in regions most proximate to the violence. We also find that awareness of the court did not moderate negative reactions, and support for the government magnified the negative reactions. Our findings help explain why support for international law and institutions is often ephemeral, eroding government cooperation with institutions.