Correlated quantal responses and equilibrium selection
نویسنده
چکیده
This paper considers incomplete information games with payoffs subject to correlated random disturbances. It explains the connection between the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria, where large noise is required, and the uniqueness of equilibria in global games, where small noise is required. JEL classifications: C72, D82.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 57 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2006