Effi ciency in a search and matching model with participation policy

نویسنده

  • Adrian Masters
چکیده

This note presents a random search and matching model with ex ante heterogeneity in worker productivity. A Social Planner with the power to prevent labor market participation by the least productive is shown to increase economic effi ciency. This is true even at the Hosios rule which, under worker homogeneity, implements the constrained effi cient allocation.

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تاریخ انتشار 2015