Beyond Fiasco: A Reappraisal of the Groupthink Phenomenon and a New Model of Group Decision Processes

In the past two decades, there has been a substantial increase in emphasis on groups in organizations in general (e.g., Leavitt, 1975; Ouchi, 1981; Zander, 1982) and on group problem solving in particular (e.g., Brandstatter, Davis, & Schuler, 1978; Delbecq, Van de Ven, & Gustafson, 1975). However, surprisingly little attention has been paid to the development of comprehensive models of group problem solving. Models are available to suggest when groups, rather than individuals, should be used for problem solving (Vroom & Yetton, 1973) and the appropriate composition and functioning options of problem-solving groups (Stumpf, Zand, & Freedman, 1979), and several specific group problem-solving techniques have been presented (e.g., Rohrbaugh, 1979; Turoff, 1971; Van de Ven & Delbecq, 1971). Furthermore, generic models of group functioning are also available but do not lend themselves to application specifically to group problem solving (e.g., Romans, 1950). However, popular, comprehensive, general models of group problem solving are lacking. The groupthink model (Janis, 1971,1972,1982) is the most prominent attempt to fill this void. In recent years, acceptance of the groupthink phenomenon has become almost universal, and the term groupthink has entered the popular vocabulary. It has been blamed for such decision-making fiascoes as the Bay of Pigs invasion, the escalation of the Vietnam conflict, the Watergate cover-up, and the Challenger disaster, as well as for flawed group problem solving in business and other organizations. Despite Longley and Pruitt's (1980) warning that both