A new old solution for weak tournaments

This note uncovers new properties of the von Neumann-Morgenstern solution in weak tournaments and majoritarian games. We propose a new procedure for the construction of choice sets from weak tournaments, based on dynamic stability criteria. The idea is to analyze dynamic versions of the tournament game introduced by Laffond, Laslier and Le Breton (1993) [The bipartisan set of a tournament game. Games and Economic Behavior 5, 182-201]. The exploration of a speci c class of Markov perfect equilibria in these dynamic tournament games yields a new solution concept for weak tournaments the A-stable set. The alternatives in an A-stable set constitute persistent, long-run policy outcomes in the corresponding dynamic tournament games. We nd that, in any weak tournament, the class of A-stable sets coincides with that of von Neumann-Morgenstern stable sets. JEL classi cation: C71, C73, D72.