Identification and Testable Restrictions in Private Value Multi-Unit Auctions
نویسنده
چکیده
Abstract This paper studies discriminatory and uniform price auctions, the two most common “multi-unit auctions” for selling multiple identical objects. In such auctions, the distribution of bidder values is only partially identified from the distribution of bids. Given (asymmetric unobserved) correlated private values, sufficient conditions are provided for a given bid distribution to be rationalized by equilibrium behavior. Given independent private values, all value distributions that rationalize the data are identified. Given non-increasing marginal values, the best response hypothesis can be tested and lower bounds obtained on the extent to which each bidder fails to play a best response.
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