The Case for Promoting Democracy Through Export Control

" Is the Separation of Powers Principle Exportable? " That is the question posed to the contributors to this Symposium. The answer I offer here turns not on abstract principles but on my assessment of the real‐world consequences of exporting the presidential system of separation of powers to other countries. This approach is grounded in the belief that a system of gov‐ ernance should be judged in significant part by how well it serves the best interests of the people whose lives it governs. If fragile democracies that import our system of separation of powers are more likely to collapse as a result, then we should be exceedingly cautious about aggressively exporting our sys‐ tem to those countries. I begin by clarifying the scope of the debate. I then turn to the normative question on which the debate turns: Is it wise to export the United States's presidential system of separation of powers? Judging on the basis of the available empirical evi‐ dence, I conclude that usually it is not. The best empirical evi‐ dence points to the conclusion that fragile democracies that adopt a United States‐inspired presidential 1 model of govern‐ ance are, all else equal, more likely to collapse than those that adopt a parliamentary system. I want to begin by making clear what is and is not the subject of debate in this Symposium. This debate is not about whether the presidential system is right for the United States. Most com‐ mentators would agree that the presidential system works well for the United States—warts and all—and few would advocate 1. Following the convention in the literature, this Essay uses the term " presiden‐ tial system " as a synonym for the U.S. system of separation of powers.