Additive Barter Models *
نویسنده
چکیده
The paper presents some models involving a pair of actors that aim at bartering the goods from two privately owned pools of heterogeneous goods. In the models we discuss in the paper the barter can occur only once and can involve either a single good or a basket of goods from each actor/player. In the paper we examine both the basic symmetric model (one-to-one barter) as well as some other versions (one-to-many, many-to-one and many-to-many barters) none of which reproduces a symmetric situation. The paper presents the models, their structure and describe some possible strategies. It also presents a set of performance criteria and shows how the proposed models satisfy them. keywords: barter models, exchange of items, exchange algorithms, mechanism design, performance criteria JEL Classification codes: C70, D61, D63, D82
منابع مشابه
Iterative barter models
The paper presents two models of iterative barter where two players (A and B) aim at exchanging a pair of items without sharing any common scale of evaluation nor any common numerary good as the money. An item may be either a good or a chore (i. e. a bad) or a service of some kind and may “belong” to either players. In the first model every player proposes to the other a pair of items in an alt...
متن کاملKnowledge Barter in Cities
Since Marshall (1890), it has been common for economists to model knowledge transfers as exogenous spillovers. However, there are many instances of knowledge transfers that are deliberate and reciprocal. This paper models these endogenous knowledge transfers and shows that endogenous knowledge barter is fundamentally different than exogenous spillovers. Holding city size fixed, we show that kno...
متن کاملBarter models ∗
This paper presents a family of models that involve a pair of actors that aim at bartering the goods from two privately owned pools of heterogeneous goods. The barter can occur only once or can be a repeated process with possibilities of retaliation and can involve either a single good or a basket of goods from each actor. We are indeed going to examine both the basic symmetric model (one-to-on...
متن کاملAsymmetry, imperfectly transferable utility, and the role of fiat money in improving terms of trade
We modify the Kiyotaki and Wright (1991, J. Economic Theory 53, 215 235; 1993, Amer. Econom. Rev. 83, 63-77) framework so that there is a universal double coincidence of wants in all barter matches. We also introduce divisible service sidepayments into the model and allow agents to bargain over bundles of goods, services and money in bilateral matches. In asymmetric matches, the agent that valu...
متن کامل