Bargaining with Periodic Participation Costs
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study a bargaining game in which a player needs to pay a fixed cost in the beginning of every period t, if he wants to stay in the game in period t + 1, in case a deal has not been reached by the end of t. Whether a player pays this cost is his private information. Every efficient payoff vector can be approximated in equilibrium. When costs of delay vanish, the value of every symmetric stationary equilibrium converges to zero. Applications of our model include bargaining through representatives, trading off bargaining and other activities, and collusion in auctions.
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