Open to debate: moral consideration and the lab monkey.

It is not often that one reads of suggestions to reset the default presumption. Most moral theorists appear to ignore governing presumptions altogether, to assume that all actions take place within an ideal space of reasons, unsullied by presumption. But I think this is precisely the area that needs adjustment, and I have argued as much in other articles (Hale 2006a, 2006b, 2007, 2008). As Fiester (2008) rightly notes, the governing presumption of animal biotechnology research is that, in the absence of a good reason not to conduct research, anything and everything is on the table. With the burden of proof on the shoulders of those who oppose research, it is open season for animals until opponents have made their case. On its face this smacks of the precautionary principle. Fiester (2008) does not clearly tease out the contours of the distinction between the precautionary principle and the presumption of restraint in her target article, and instead devotes only a few paragraphs to treatment of the distinction between the two. I think the distinction needs a sharper edge before I address what is really on my mind. Despite first appearances, the precautionary principle functions differently than a presumption of restraint. The precautionary principle advocates only that when one acts, one should act with an abundance of caution. It thus advocates in favor of action, albeit action of a nimble and neurotic sort. Suggesting that one should presume restraint, on the other hand, advocates against action. It is, in Fiester’s (2008) words, “a default principle that guides action in the absence of compelling, overriding reasons that speak in the action’s favor” (36). She might better have said it is a principle that restrains action; that permits action only when it is justified. In effect, shifting the default presumption means that one must act with good reason, that one ought not to act absent a good reason. I strongly agree that this is a first and important step in gaining traction among institutional review boards and other approval boards. Here is where I differ. Fiester’s (2008) argument works primarily along pragmatic lines. She suggests that for every outraged reaction to animal biotech experiments, there is a plausible retort from the optimist about experimentation. As a result of this, some ghastly experiments continue without input from these concerned and critical parties. She then introduces four claims that she believes most people would accept, followed by a set of facts that is incontrovertibly true about animals, all of which she then subjects to an extreme case of experimen-