Selection effects in auctions for monopoly rights
نویسندگان
چکیده
We demonstrate that auctioning market licenses may result in higher market prices than assigning them via more random allocation mechanisms. When future market pro t is uncertain, winning an auction is like winning a lottery ticket. If rms di¤er in risk attitudes, auctions select the least risk averse rm, which, in turn, set a higher price (or a higher quantity, in case quantity is the decision variable) in the marketplace than an average rm.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 134 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2007