Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining
نویسندگان
چکیده
We prove uniqueness of stationary equilibria in a one-dimensional model of bargaining with quadratic utilities, for an arbitrary common discount factor. For general concave utilities, we prove existence and uniqueness of a “minimal” stationary equilibrium and of a “maximal” stationary equilibrium. We provide an example of multiple stationary equilibria with concave (non-quadratic) utilities. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D70, D72.
منابع مشابه
Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
Article history: Received 19 May 2009 Available online 2 February 2011 JEL classification: C78
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 113 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2003