Optimizing the Social Cost of Congestion Games by Imposing Variable Delays
نویسندگان
چکیده
We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism does not incur any additional extra cost, like tolls, which are usually differentiated from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays only.
منابع مشابه
Polynomial Bottleneck Congestion Games with Optimal Price of Anarchy
We study bottleneck congestion games where the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. These games directly relate to network routing problems and also job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck congestion games, the utility costs of the players are determined by the worst congested resources that they use. However, the resulting Nash equilibria are inefficie...
متن کاملOptimal Price of Anarchy of Polynomial and Super-Polynomial Bottleneck Congestion Games
We introduce (super) polynomial bottleneck games, where the utility costs of the players are (super) polynomial functions of the congestion of the resources that they use, and the social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource. In particular, the delay function for any resource r is of the form CMr r , where Cr is the congestion measured as the number of players that use r, a...
متن کاملAltruism in Congestion Games
This paper studies the effects of introducing altruistic agents into atomic congestion games. Altruistic behavior is modeled by a trade-off between selfish and social objectives. In particular, we assume agents optimize a linear combination of personal delay of a strategy and the resulting increase in social cost. Our model can be embedded in the framework of congestion games with player-specif...
متن کاملOn the Price of Anarchy and Stability of Correlated Equilibria of Linear Congestion Games
We consider the price of stability for Nash and correlated equilibria of linear congestion games. The price of stability is the optimistic price of anarchy, the ratio of the cost of the best Nash or correlated equilibrium over the social optimum. We show that for the sum social cost, which corresponds to the average cost of the players, every linear congestion game has Nash and correlated price...
متن کاملThe marginal social cost of travel time variability
This paper investigates the cost of travel time variability for car users at the peak hour. In particular, we derive the marginal social cost of travel time variability, which takes the feedback of travel time unreliability on the congestion profile into account. This is in contrast with the value of travel time variability, which treats congestion as an exogenous phenomenon. Congestion is mode...
متن کاملذخیره در منابع من
با ذخیره ی این منبع در منابع من، دسترسی به آن را برای استفاده های بعدی آسان تر کنید
برای دانلود متن کامل این مقاله و بیش از 32 میلیون مقاله دیگر ابتدا ثبت نام کنید
ثبت ناماگر عضو سایت هستید لطفا وارد حساب کاربری خود شوید
ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- CoRR
دوره abs/1406.5153 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2014